I have discussed Structural Realism in previous writings, but it is necessary to reiterate its core tenets here due to its relevance in explaining this conflict.
Structural Realism, or Neorealism, rests on five fundamental assumptions about the international system:
- States are the principal actors in an anarchic international system. There is no overarching authority that governs the conduct of states. Institutions such as the United Nations are often ineffective in crises involving great power interests. For example, any potential action by the UN Security Council can be blocked by one of the five permanent members wielding veto power—rendering the organization largely powerless when it matters most.
- States possess varying capabilities, and military power is the most important factor in determining a state’s relative strength.
- Some states are more powerful than others.
- States can never be certain of other states’ intentions, particularly future intentions.
- The primary goal of every state is survival. Without survival, no other objectives can be pursued. States are rational actors that strategically pursue their national interests (Mearsheimer, 2001).
Point five is especially crucial in understanding this conflict—yet it is often overlooked in Western discourse.
From these assumptions flow several patterns of state behavior:
- States seek to maximize their share of global power because doing so enhances their chances of survival.
- States inherently fear one another due to power asymmetries and uncertainty about intentions.
- States understand that they operate in a self-help system, where no external authority can guarantee their security (Mearsheimer, 2001).
Within this framework, two central goals define great power behavior:
- Great powers aim to achieve regional hegemony, as this is the surest path to long-term security.
- They also seek to prevent peer competitors from attaining regional hegemony, to avoid direct threats to their own survival (Mearsheimer, 2001).
This theory of international politics serves as the foundation of my analysis.
NATO Expansionism
To understand why Russia invaded Ukraine, one must first understand the history and logic of NATO’s post-Cold War expansion.
NATO was founded with twelve members: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Greece and Turkey joined in 1952, West Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982—completing the first wave of expansion. Russia tolerated this phase with relative calm.
The second wave began in 1999 with the admission of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. Poland’s inclusion was especially significant due to its size and strategic location. Further expansions in 2004 added Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, followed by Albania and Croatia in 2009. While this steady eastward movement of NATO was troubling to Russia, these states were generally smaller and seen as less consequential to Russian security.
However, the turning point came at the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, when NATO declared that Ukraine and Georgia “will become members.” From Russia’s perspective, this crossed a red line. Ukraine and Georgia are former Soviet republics that lie directly on Russia’s borders and are deeply embedded within Russia’s historical and strategic sphere of influence. The prospect of these countries joining a U.S.-led military alliance was viewed as an existential threat to Russian security.
Russia responded by warning that it would not allow Ukraine to join NATO—a position it has maintained consistently since 2008. The Bucharest Summit, therefore, can be seen as the moment the seeds of the current conflict were planted.
NATO’s overarching aim has been to eliminate Russia’s sphere of influence in Europe. In contrast, Russia—a declining great power—is striving to preserve that sphere as essential to its long-term survival. To Russians, NATO’s offer of membership to Ukraine represents an intolerable threat. It is akin to Mexico joining a military alliance with China or Russia—a move the United States would never tolerate. For decades, the U.S. has enforced the Monroe Doctrine, asserting exclusive influence over the Western Hemisphere.
The 2014 Ukrainian Revolution and Crimea
The immediate trigger for today’s war occurred on February 22, 2014, when a pro-Russian government under President Yanukovych was ousted following mass protests in Kyiv. Yanukovych had rejected an EU association agreement in favor of closer ties with Russia, prompting demonstrations that escalated into violent clashes. Yanukovych fled the country, and a new pro-Western government took power.
In response, Crimea’s parliament voted to join Russia, a referendum was held (widely disputed internationally), and Russia formally annexed Crimea. Importantly, Russia did not “invade” Crimea in the conventional sense—it already had troops stationed there under a leasing agreement for its naval base in Sevastopol. Nonetheless, the annexation marked a sharp escalation in the conflict.
The 2022 Invasion of Ukraine
On February 24, 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It appeared that the initial strategy was a blitzkrieg-style offensive aimed at quickly toppling the Ukrainian government and installing a pro-Russian regime. This included targeted bombing of military bases and air defenses, granting Russia initial air superiority.
However, Ukraine mounted a fierce and unexpected resistance. The Russian advance on Kyiv stalled, and the anticipated collapse of Ukrainian defenses did not materialize. Moreover, the invasion triggered a surge of Ukrainian nationalism—even in areas with previously strong pro-Russian sentiment.
Russia also faced unprecedented economic sanctions from the West. The Russian ruble plummeted by nearly 30%, and the Moscow stock exchange was temporarily shut down. These sanctions severely impacted both the Russian elite and the general population.
Strategically, I believe Russia’s long-term objective is to re-establish a buffer zone between itself and NATO. Ideally, Russia hoped to achieve this through regime change in Kyiv. Failing that, a more realistic goal may be the creation of a pro-Russian proxy state in Ukraine’s east and south. This could include the oblasts of Sumy, Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Crimea, and Sevastopol—effectively severing Ukraine from its eastern and Black Sea regions.
Such a partition could be mutually beneficial:
Ukraine would be free to pursue NATO and EU integration without the baggage of contested pro-Russian regions. Russia would maintain a strategic buffer against NATO encroachment. Ukraine could consolidate a smaller, more cohesive, and more Western-oriented national identity.
Conclusion
Only time will tell how this war will end. But as with so many great power conflicts, it is the people—on both sides—who bear the greatest cost. As civilian casualties in Ukraine continue to mount and the humanitarian toll deepens, it is vital to understand the underlying causes of this war if we hope to achieve a lasting peace.
Source:
Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001.